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Fisheries reform in Cambodia has provided a larger space for the participation of communi-
ties dependent on small-scale fisheries in the use and management of their natural resourc-
es. The rights and responsibilities of Community Fisheries (CFi) are held in Cambodian law 
and other legal documents, such as the Sub-decree on Community Fisheries Management. 
However, widespread mismanagement leading up to such reforms is also reported to be 
the cause of new institutional uncertainties, challenges, and risks of conflict.
This report aims to determine whether rights-based incentive structures actually help 
improve fisheries management and governance. As such, the research compares CFi 
rights and responsibilities as defined in the Cambodian legal framework, with their actual 
implementation in local contexts.
Qualitative research methods, including focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant 
interviews (KIIs), and site observations were conducted at nine (9) inland and coastal CFis, 
with these classified into four groups based on their size and institutional dynamics.
The report argues that the rights-based incentives and regulatory structures for community 
fisheries activities in Cambodia are inadequate to improve the management of fisheries in 
all its dimensions (productivity, control of illegal activities, benefit sharing, etc.).
• First, CFi access is complex, due to the non-exclusionary nature of the CFis, 
misalignment between community fishing areas and actual fishing grounds, and 
unclear CFi boundaries. As a result, illegal fishing activities remain a major problem 
across CFis. The cancellation of commercial fishing lots is perceived as a positive 
outcome by fishermen because it is has resulted in an expansion of community 
fisheries areas. However, our respondents also indicated that the opening of the 
fishing frontier has created space for opportunism, attracting new actors across 
fishing sectors (including commercial middle-scale fishers) and, in a context of 
management uncertainty, has resulted in an increase of illegal fishing activities. 
• Second, the right to operate commercial community-based fisheries activities for 
income generation at the community-level is not granted by current Cambodi-
an law. This omission limits a community’s negotiating power in co-management 
deliberations, and represents a key bottleneck in the CFi system, undermining 
its longer term sustainability. This report identifies exceptional cases of larger 
and institutionally more dynamic CFis engaged in commercial community-based 
fisheries which, significantly, enables more effective management of the CFi, 
despite its ‘marginal’ legality.
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• Third, there are no legal restrictions on the type and number of family-scale 
fishing gear, other than the regulation of net length and mesh size; the volume 
of fish catch is not itself restricted. However, the CFis report concerns regarding 
the decline in individual fish catches due to an increase in numbers of fishers. This 
situation is an issue that CFi management, despite efforts to conserve spawn-
ing habitats, appears unable to address, and which diminishes the sense of local 
ownership of CFi management. 
• 
• Fourth, the rights of individual fishers to participate as co-management actors in 
CFi decision-making processes appear weak, as the state maintains strong control 
over the entire CFi process. For instance, with the exception of only two CFis, 
all CFIs assessed have rights only to relay any dispute to FiA Cantonment and 
local authorities, request intervention, and wait for their arrival to work 
together on its resolution. The exceptions are 2 cases where an unofficial 
agreement was reached between FiA and CFi to allow the communities to 
temporarily arrest offenders before the arrival of FiA officers. This agreement 
does not comply with legally defined rights and responsibilities, yet it enables 
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(1)
Introduction
Fisheries reform in Cambodia has been an ongoing process since 2000, successively 
marked by the partial cancellation of commercial fishing lots in 2000/2001; establishment 
of the institutional arrangement known as Community Fisheries (CFi) and, ultimately, the 
cancellation of all fishing lots in 2012.
While increasing the areas available for CFi, as well as those designated for conservation, 
the reforms introduced an array of new institutional uncertainties, challenges and risks of 
conflict (Jones & Say, 2015; Kim, Mam, Oeur, So & Blake, 2013; Milne, 2013). The challeng-
es are particularly acute for CFi management, which has become the central institution for 
fisheries management in Cambodia.
The project ‘Strengthening Community Fisheries Management and Livelihoods 
Diversification in Cambodia’ in the regions of the Tonle Sap and Coastal Provinces(1), is an 
attempt to strengthen small-scale fishing activities in Cambodia. It posits manifold objectives: 
to strengthen the rights of CFi members; enhance the capacity of local youth groups and 
community fisheries organizations to support sustainable fisheries and habitat 
management, and improve recognition of the role of women in fisheries, and integrate 
gender perspective into the development of rural/coastal livelihoods and community 
fisheries and habitat management.
The research report examines the transformation of fisheries governance using a 
rights-based approach (RBA). We aim to assess the level of consistency between the 
legal framework definition of community fisheries rights and responsibilities, and the actual 
implementation of those rights by CFi groups in their local context. We also investi-
gate whether and how operative fishing rights actually facilitate and improve fisheries 
management and governance. We aim to identify the circumstances, context and 
conditions under which these rights are successfully exercised and enforced, and 
whether this results in any recognizable improvement of fisheries and of local governance 
and management processes. Discussion of fishers’ rights are contextualized through the 
themes of i) access boundaries, ii) productivity of resources, and iii) ownership of CFi 
institutional process. Where possible, we present examples of how locally derived 
institutions actually help to improve CFi management, but suggest that, more generally, 
there is insufficient operationalization of rights-based approaches and incentive structures 
for CFi to improve Cambodian freshwater and marine fisheries. 
2Significance of Fisheries in Cambodia
Fisheries are at a crossroads in Cambodia. On one side, fisheries play a crucial role in 
the lives of Cambodians and the country’s economic growth; environmental protection 
and conservation of biodiversity; good governance, and poverty alleviation (Fisheries 
Administration, 2011b). On the other side, the broader social value of fisheries is 
marginalized or discounted in key government policy-making in sectors of agriculture, 
energy and water.
Over the 10-year period spanning 2001 to 2011, fisheries production in Cambodia – 
including both subsistence and commercial fisheries, and the aquaculture sector – 
amounted overall to between 300,000 and 600,000 tons per year, comprising 79% 
freshwater fish, 14% marine and 7% from aquaculture. The trend in fish production has 
steadily increased during this past decade: while the inland fisheries sector saw a 29% 
increase, marine fisheries production doubled and, although its overall contribution 
remains relatively small, aquaculture production increased five-fold during the period. The 
inland fisheries sector contributes by far the largest share of fish supply in Cambodia, but is 
currently stagnant and may eventually show a production decline (Baran et al., 2014).
A recent study by the Inland Fisheries Research and Development Institute (IFReDI, 2013) 
found that the second largest food source for Cambodians (after rice) is aquatic resources, 
i.e. fish and other aquatic animals such as crabs, molluscs and frogs, at 63 kg per person 
annually, representing 76% of the population’s total animal protein intake.
Fisheries production, in terms of inland and coastal fisheries harvesting, processing 
and trade, is estimated at approximately USD 300 million per year, a contribution of 
between 8% and 12% to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and an overall gross value of USD 2 
billion (Fisheries Administration, 2011b). IFReDI (2013) estimates that at USD1.6/kg, the total 
economic value of freshwater fish and aquatic products has reached 1 billion per year. 
However, such figures are contested, and other observers assert that the value of capture 
fish production is not well known, since there is no systematic assessment of the price of 
fish per kilogram, resulting in an undervaluation of the contribution of fisheries to GDP 
(Baran et al., 2014).
In terms of employment opportunities, it is estimated that the fisheries sector provides 
full-time, part-time and seasonal work to around 2 million of Cambodia’s 14 million, with 
10.5% of full-time workers and 34% of part time workers involved in fishing. Other research 
has established that the fisheries sector provides income and livelihoods to 46% of the total 
population, or about 6.7 million people, and represents over 10% of GDP (Johnstone et al., 
2013).
3The stated aim of the 2006 Fisheries Law is to implement both inland and coastal fisheries 
management based on a conservation perspective, in addition to promoting the livelihoods 
of local communities (RGC, 2006). It defines and regulates fishery practices in Cambodia on 
the basis of operational scale (small, medium and large-scale); corresponding types, length 
and size of fishing gears, and fishing season(s) and areas. 
The management of fisheries resources in Cambodia is now largely devoted to small-scale 
fishermen, organized (or not) as CFis, as a result of the ‘reform’ process unfolding over the 
last 15 years. Two distinct phases can be seen to constitute this process, each characterised 
by an important landmark: the first by the 2000-2001 cancellation of approximately 56% 
of commercial fishing lot areas, and the second by the complete cancellation of the fishing 
lots in 2012. In the following section, we look at these two periods of reforms and examine 
their implications in terms of fishing rights.
First phase of reform
In early 2000, Cambodian fisheries were in an institutional crisis. The management of 
commercial fishing, introduced under the French protectorate (1863-1954) and reinstituted 
following the civil war, gave rise to a number of problems and conflicts that the government 
had difficulty addressing (Degen et al., 2000). Large scale aquatic resource concessions 
enabled elite stakeholders to strictly control access to lake resources, extract large aquatic 
resource rents and pay little in tax, without being subject to any truly effective upward 
accountability to the FiA (Jones & Say, 2015).
The RGC, under the direct order and supervision of Prime Minister Hun Sen, then 
decided to reduce the area of commercial fishing lots by 56%, or more than half a million 
hectares, and transferred the decommissioned area to small-scale local fishers who were 
subsequently organized into CFi, in a co-management arrangement with the FiA (Johnstone 
et al., 2013; Mom, 2009).
This reform entailed far more than the cancellation of fishing lots and establishment 
of CFi; it  led to the creation of new state institutions, such as the Community Fisheries 
Development Office(2) (CFDO), and a new legal framework, in the form of the 2006 Law 
on Fisheries and Community Fisheries Sub-decree, representing a more holistic approach 
to fisheries management (CFDO, 2004). The Law and sub-decree are currently the only 
accepted legal mechanisms for identifying rights and responsibilities in fishing activities 
in Cambodia, and the FiA of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF)
Fisheries Reforms and Fishing Rights in Cambodia
1. On 21st February, 2001, the MAFF established a new unit within the Department of Fisheries, the Community Fisheries 
Development Office (CFDO) specifically tasked with supporting communities to manage the newly released fishing areas and 
encouraging more participatory management of fisheries countrywide (CFDO, 2004).
(2)
41. Elite fishers: the wealthy fisher who can afford larger and more sophisticated gear.(3)
holds oversight responsibility for all aspects of fisheries management, including the 
implementation of any fisheries reform and development of corresponding legal 
framework; monitoring of fisheries management, and enforcement of the Fisheries Law.
Kurien et al. (2006) argued that reform of the fisheries sector in Cambodia should aim to 
allow more freedom for resource users to manage local resources, based on co-manage-
ment practices involving the state and community-based fisheries groups in a process 
supported and mediated by a diversity of NGOs, civil society groups and donors. The 
establishment of CFi brought attention to both community-level rights and formal state 
rights and responsibilities, and as a co-management mechanism, has been an attempt 
towards more inclusive and effective small-scale fisheries management in Cambodia.
However, the institutional and managerial challenges that the reform had to address 
were immense, and the first outcomes were far from satisfactory. An early impact 
assessment on policy reform (CFDO, 2004) revealed that this reform resulted in providing more 
opportunities for fisherfolk to access fishery resources in a wider area, and even increase 
their income. However, it also allowed for more unregulated competition among fishers, 
ultimately controlled by elite fishers(3) and some corrupt elements of local authority, such 
that the poor could not find effective ways to take full advantage of this new freedom 
of movement and access. The assessment argued that with over-exploitation due to an 
increase both in numbers of fishermen and in the use of illegal fishing gear, the catch per 
unit effort (CPUE) had declined and conflicts increased. This reform also confused the rights, 
roles, and responsibilities of fisheries-related stakeholders. Another assessment (Viner et 
al, 2006) further suggested that the performance and sustainability of co-management 
arrangements were constrained by a lack of clearly defined property rights, resource 
boundaries and access control, and a mismatch between resource scale and management 
initiatives.
A wide consensus emerged in the 2000s, suggesting the need for future co-management to 
establish flexible, long-term goals; clear and defined roles and management responsibilities 
for both resource users and state government, and viable paths for alternative livelihoods, 
allowing for exit from fishery and reduction of pressure on fishery resources.
Second phase of reform
Seeing that the first reform was not ‘deep’ enough to solve the long standing 
conflicts in Cambodian fisheries and accompanied by increased demands for access from 
communities, Prime Minister Hun Sen made the unilateral decision in 2007, in line with 
the government priority of assisting small-scale fishing livelihoods, to cancel the remaining 
fishing lots along the Tonle Sap and allocate them for public use and conservation (Kim, 
et al., 2013). 
5This second reform has produced significant, if some unintended, outcomes. With all 
fishing lots cancelled, community fisheries now supposedly have greater access to fishery 
resources in the Tonle Sap Lake (Kaing, 2013). However, many have suggested that 
this second reform was introduced too quickly, with little forethought, and without 
addressing the wider social and natural resource policy implications. Unclear plans and 
strategies formulated at the national level have resulted in growing confusion over the 
jurisdictions and roles pertaining to sub-national governance (Johnstone et al., 2013; 
Kim et al., 2013).
Kim et al. (2013) suggest that neither the operational and institutional arrangements, nor the 
capacity of stakeholders, were mature enough to manage such a wide-ranging reform. For 
instance, CFis are taking action to be ready for larger areas; but despite all CFis in Tonle Sap 
being registered, some are not aware of their legal rights, roles and responsibilities,   while 
some lack sufficient will and commitment on the part of members (Kim et al., 2013). These 
shortcomings limit the ability of CFis to advocate in their members’ interest and effectively 
collaborate with the range of both rights- and stakeholders. There is limited budget support 
to implement boundary tenure rights in the fisheries (Kaing, 2013); most CFis still depend 
on external financial and logistical support (Kaing, 2013). In addition, CFi capacity is not at 
a level to manage larger CFi areas (Kim, et al., 2013). Johnstone et al. (2013) point out that 
conflicts over competing resource benefits still remain, and now also include key conflicts 
over the allocation of water for agriculture and/or fisheries. The current policy and legal 
reforms are insufficient to address the challenges of sustainable resource management and 
resilient livelihoods on the aquatic social-ecological systems in Cambodia. Fostering truly 
effective and just fishery governance (policy and management) in Cambodia will require 
much greater commitment and direct involvement of all actors, including fisherfolk, CFi 
committee members, the FiA and related agencies (Kim, et al., 2013). The authors further 
highlight the emergence of a community-based commercial production model that would 
render the engagement of CFi members in community management financially beneficial. 
However, it is questioned to what extent the current legal framework allows this, and how 
long it would take to implement.
Fisheries reforms and fishing rights in Cambodia
The impacts and consequences of governance and management actions on fisheries are 
vitally important to those whose livelihoods depend primarily on the harvest and sale 
of fishery resources. It is not surprising that any unilateral changes to policy and any 
subsequent regulatory and management actions profoundly affect the manner by which 
people access, harvest and sell these resources (Kurien et al., 2006).
The fisheries reforms described above engaged a diversity of actors in the design of new 
rights, involving legal and social normative principles guiding what is permitted or owed 
to people in the fisheries sector (from pre- to post-production), according to legitimate 
institutions such as reflect legal and social norms and value systems. The assignment 
of new rights comes with new responsibilities, which are embedded in new forms of 
accountability between fisherfolk, their community-based organizations, and the FiA as
6state representative.
In the specific case of Cambodia, the fisheries sector reforms do not simply consist of 
transferring rights from fishing lot actors to community-based fishing organizations – 
there are two distinct elements involved, each of which responding to specific actors, 
institutions and constraints. First, the reforms entailed the cancellation of rights from fishing 
concessions, and then the creation, in-situ, of expanded or new common property rights.
These issues entail new challenges for fisheries management, and the need to pay 
greater attention to the rights of fisherfolk in developing fisheries policy and management 
objectives (Charles, 2011; Lam & Pauly, 2010).
• The two phases of fisheries reform can be seen to result in both advantages and 
disadvantages for small-scale fishers in Cambodia. Small scale fisherfolk have 
formed their own norms within the communities to claim the right to access 
resources, solve conflicts, and ensure equity. These unwritten yet widely known 
and operational norms are referred to as informal or ‘customary’ rights (ICSF, 
2007). In this regard, Charles (2011) argues that political or deliberative space 
is needed to reinforce existing fishery rights, rather than develop new ones. 
However, the reinforcement and exercise of such standing rights both promises 
benefits and poses challenges to small-scale fisheries.
• 
• The design of common property rights-based fisheries engages a 
co-production between the state and communities that requires mutual respect 
and trust between these partners. A central challenge in Cambodia is that many 
fisherfolk are not aware of their rights, or are unable to exercise and claim their 
rights; it is therefore very difficult to challenge fishery officials and to themselves 
 take responsibility as resource managers, because of this limited power, 
knowledge and lack of enabling institutional arrangements (Isaacs, 2006 in Allison 
et al., 2012). This requires the central government to devolve rights and sufficient 
financial and logistic resources to CFis, ensuring the community is equipped 
to fulfil its responsibilities and exercise its rights (Allison, et al., 2012; Viner, et 
al., 2006).
• 
• The benefit that common property rights can provide to communities also 
depends upon the capacity of fisherfolk to claim and ensure enforcement of 
any new rights, in a context where previous power structures and relations 
governing resource extraction in fishing concessions are not totally dismantled 
(Tep et al., 2007). The exercise of such rights also depends on overcoming all drivers 
(socio-political, ecological and economic) that create exclusions from the 
resources, increase vulnerability, and continue to hinder rights being realized. 
Authors have pointed out that investment in fishing rights has failed where 
aspects of livelihood and well-being for fisherfolk are not completely addressed 
(Allison et al., 2012). Indeed, after their establishment, CFis were made aware of 
their rights to fish and to stop illegal fishing activities; however, mere awareness
7• of rights might not be enough for them to assert them (ICSF, 2007). 
Constraints in this respect might include a lack of recognition of basic human 
rights in the state control and management of critical livelihoods resources; lack 
of legally enforced protection and conservation of fisheries resources, and lack of 
awareness of rights regarding access to alternative livelihoods. Thus the 
exercise and defence of fishing rights in particular might be hindered by a lack 
of capacity and finance; limited awareness of fisheries law and related legal 
instruments; lack of recognition and commitment to community rights by local 
authorities and relevant agencies, and a legal framework limited to the rights 
of CFis, with few options for community members to address poor CFi/FiA 
performance.
Actions taken to protect rights must include advocacy from the grassroots level, and 
consultation with all stake- and rights-holders to find possible solutions. In addition, 
gender awareness should be raised, among both men and women, regarding the 
critical role played by women in small-scale fisheries, so that both are better able to 
fully and equally participate in fisheries development, as well as to pursue diversification of 
livelihoods (ICSF, 2007).
There is a need to ‘bundle’ these fishing rights in direct accordance to the needs of fishing 
communities, so that they have legal options to sustainably manage their fishery resources 
(Ratner et al., 2014). In any comprehensive and inclusive reform process, all fishery actors 
(state, government, private and finance sectors, and civil society organizations) need to be 
involved in the design, implementation and evaluation of any reform process, and to rapidly 
assess and identify whose rights are at risk (Ratner et al., 2014).
In this context, the questions to be asked are: What rights, and for whom? How do such 
rights contribute to a more holistic approach to fisheries management in Cambodia? 
How can existing rights or new rights-based processes improve the legitimacy of fisheries 
co-management processes in Cambodia? How will rights bundles meet new emerging 
conflicts of interest, foster new alliances, and address new threats and opportunities? What 
will happen when the rights offered by the state do not meet the needs of community 
fisheries?
81. The code is available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm
1. This guideline is available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/ssf/guidelines/en
(4)
(5)
Research Framework and Methodology
Theoretical perspectives on rights
Regarding fisheries rights, we refer to the work of Anthony Charles, who asserts that rights 
are used to specify the resource users and the resource to be used, in order to allow more 
effective fishery management (Charles, 2002). When the word ‘rights’ is used in fisheries 
discussions, Charles argues that two very different ideas come to mind, depending on one’s 
perspective:
First, from a fisheries management perspective, rights define who can engage in fishing 
activities and who can be involved in managing the CFi. This perspective is referred to as 
‘right-based fisheries’, which involves developing a process by which fisherfolk have the 
fundamental right to be included in developing fisheries management objectives and the 
manner of their implementation. It is concerned with fishing rights based on a search 
for greater efficiency in resource use. This form of rights arises in what is referred to as 
rights-based fishery management, focusing on the rights (together with the responsibilities) 
held by individuals, communities, companies and/or government, specifically in relation to 
fisheries management (Charles, 2011). This approach argues that to become sustainable 
and profitable, the fishing sector must move towards a management model allowing for 
restrictions on individuals’ access, means/fishing efforts, and catch size. The assumption is 
that the more complete the set of rights, the less exposed the fishers are to the unintended 
action of others (Allison et al., 2012).
Second, from the perspective of the individuals and communities engaged in fishing or 
otherwise dependent on a fishery, there are human, social and economic rights that can be 
reinforced or negatively impacted by actions taken within the fishery. This has much wider 
acceptance, embedding fisheries governance within a broader perspective of human rights.
The evolution of the idea of rights, from rights-based fishing to a human rights 
perspective, is also echoed in international protocol to promote small-scale fisheries. 
The 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF)(4) sets out principles and 
international standards of behaviour for responsible practices, with a view to ensuring the 
effective conservation, management and development of living aquatic resources, with 
due respect for the ecosystem and biodiversity. Fishing rights are recognized, but in a 
manner very much focused on improving resource use efficiency; they also carry an 
obligation to do so responsibly. More recently, the Voluntary Guidelines for Securing 
Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries (FAO, 2015)(5) aim to support responsible fisheries 
and sustainable social and economic development for the benefit of current and future 
generations, with an emphasis on small-scale fishers and fish -workers and related
9activities, and including vulnerable and marginalized people, promoting a human 
rights-based approach.
For the purpose of this research, we frame fishing rights following the rights-based 
approach adapted from the work of Le Roy et al. (1996) on Land Tenure. We 
differentiate two kinds of rights commonly used in fisheries, namely use rights and 
management rights, but we recognize other broader human rights, such as cultural, 
spiritual (freedom of worship) or linguistic rights, as important to fishing individuals and 
communities.
Use rights can take the form of a bundle of rights, referring to the nature of the entitlement 
(the fishing ground – ‘what’); the beneficiary (the fisherman – ‘who’) and the conditions 
for exercising the rights, such as allowable fishing grounds (‘where’); fish catch size (‘how 
much’); types of fishing gear (‘how’) and period in certain seasons (‘when’), as well as the 
right to own the benefits of post-harvest processes (processing, sale, and consumption).
The use rights allocated to resource appropriators can be of varying ‘strengths’, ranging 
from simple access to full ownership. We distinguish 5 degrees of strength:
• Access rights (right to enter a fishing ground)
• Harvest rights (right to fish)
• Claim rights (right to modify the structure of the fishing grounds)
• Possession (right to exclude unauthorized users)
• Ownership (right to alienate fishing grounds)
Use rights are important for fishery management where a specific group of people is 
defined as having rights to be involved in fishery resources use, even when they are not the 
owner of the fishery. In adopting use rights, there needs to be flexibility and consideration 
of different factors, such as the fishery structure, pre-existing rights, history, traditions, 
society and culture; social objectives; the economic situation; political realities, and fish 
stock realities (Charles, 2002).
The term management right is more critical for fishery managers, as they define who is 
responsible for managing fishery resources. Management rights have to do with 
control. They are the rights given to managers to decide how use rights are designated and 
allocated. Management rights also include a bundle of rights referring to:
• Recognition of rights - a means to understand the system of rights which 
have been used over time by fisherfolk, and which are usually embedded in 
traditional practice. Charles (2011) argues that it is important for fishery managers to 
reinforce existing or traditional rights, rather than automatically set out to 
develop new ones. However, when existing rights no longer function to serve to 
protect the interests of the bearers, it is the responsibility of fishery managers, 
in conjunction with stakeholders, to develop new rights. They have to critically 
select rights based on five (5) factors: social objectives; relevance to history and
10
•  traditions; social, cultural, and economic relevance; key features of the fish stocks 
and the ecosystem; and the financial and human capacity of the particular fishery 
(Charles, 2002).
• Choice of rights – defines the rights allocated to the users: what; who; where; 
how; how much, and when. This selection needs to be based on the same five 
factors (above).
• Allocation of rights – determines how rights can be acquired and transferred.
• Monitoring of rights – monitoring the actual exercise of rights and the possible 
sanction of misuse and circumstances in which this occurs.
The management rights governing the type of use rights allocated to resource users can be 
controlled in 5 different ways:
The design, claims, monitoring and enforcement of rights is viewed as being one dimension 
of small-scale fisheries tenure (governance), creating a regulatory and incentive structure 
which can have both positive and negative impacts on governability, i.e., providing benefits 
from the management of a fishery.
• Public – use rights are allocated to all resources users without restriction.
• State – use rights are sanctioned by the state or its representatives.
• Co-management – use rights are determined by a sharing of powers and 
responsibilities between the state and its responsible agencies, and the 
community or sub-national groups (Charles, 2011). Rights-based fishing 
coupled with a co-management arrangement could result in improved production, 
reduced poverty, greater equity and empowerment of fishing communities 
(Allison et al., 2012).
• Community – use rights are entirely controlled by a community of users, without 
interference by the state.
• Private – use rights are managed by private operators.
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Use rights of fishers








Fisheries governance, in light of the cancellation of exclusive rights previously 
allocated to fishing lot owners and leasers, is progressively evolving towards replacement 
by a system where semi-exclusive rights are allocated to fishers via co-management 
mechanisms. This entails that the new/emergent system of rights is decided upon by fishers 
grouped under community-based organisations called Community Fisheries (CFis), and the 
state as represented by the Fisheries Administration (FiA). Co-management mechanisms 
are also instituted to regulate both open access fisheries, and any self-organized communi-
ty-based fisheries management, with their own set of rules and institutions.
The co-management approach rests on the premise that local communities living close 
to the relevant resources are best suited to sustainably manage those resources: they 
know the local ecosystems better than anyone else, and so are in a better position to 
identify both management problems affecting those ecosystems and possible solutions 
(Li, 2002). Co-management is concerned with the involvement of users in deliberative 
decision-making, and with building linkages between communities and government 
institutions. Adding an explicit focus on increasing the effectiveness of stakeholder 
participation, this management approach is supposed to foster conflict resolution and 
benefit community-based economic and social development (Armitage et al., 2007).
There are different ‘faces’ of co-management: as sharing of power and responsibility for 
management; as institution building for local-level and government agencies; as trust 
building; as process; as social learning and problem solving, and as governance-sharing of
A rights-based approach to fisheries reform in Cambodia
If we picture use and management rights as two axis of a matrix (figure 1), we can represent 






























management rights and responsibilities (Armitage et al., 2007). Co-management in the context 
of fishery rights is a sharing of rights, powers and responsibilities for management, between the 
state and its responsible agencies and the community or sub-national groups (Charles, 2011).
Research objectives and questions
Against the background of the fisheries reforms, and guided by a rights-based 
fisheries approach, this study will investigate and document the different types of fishing 
rights influencing the management of CFi in Cambodia. The specific objectives are to:
• Identify the existing fishing rights to access, use and manage fisheries resources 
within the CFi system, and to assess the adequacy of these rights in light of the 
pre-existing fisheries norms prevailing in fishing communities.
• Identify the challenges to defining, claiming and asserting these rights within the 
CFis.
• Identify capacity building needs with respect to the above, for local fisherfolk, 
women and youth groups, CFis and authorities responsible for sustainable fishery 
management.
• What are the different types or bundles of rights actually being held by fishery 
actors – CFi, FiA, etc.?
• Are CFi members well informed of those rights and ready to uphold them?
• What are these rights and how might they affect related fishery actors (CFi, 
non-CFi, and fishery authorities)? 
• What are the existing limitations to the rights held by fisherfolk in the context of 
CFi in Cambodia?
• How can these rights and those who must uphold them actually contribute to 
better fisheries management?
To meet these objectives, the research will be guided by the following questions:
Analytical approach
To address these questions and objectives, the study proceeds with a comparison 
between formal fishing rights (use and management rights) as defined in the Cambodian legal 
framework (Law and Sub-decree), and how those rights are asserted, in context, by 
different CFi groups across the country (Figure 2).
The comparative approach implies that we examine i) the institutional fit between what 
is cast formally in law, and its actual implementation ‘on the water’; ii) whether the rights 
as defined in the legal framework actually help to improve fisheries management and 
governance, and iii) the context or conditions under which these rights are successfully 
asserted and exercised, i.e., examples where a rights-based approach results in more 
effective local fisheries governance and management and thus, improved fisheries.
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 Figure 3: Map of study area
Figure 2. Analytical framework of the study




























Study area and community fisheries profiles
The field survey was conducted with nine (9) CFis in seven (7) provinces of Cambodia. These 
were grouped according to their location in inland provinces, i.e., around the Tonle Sap 
(Battambang, Pursat, and Kampong Chhnang), or in coastal provinces (Kep, Kampot, Koh 
Kong and Sihanoukville) (Figure 3). Key characteristics of each CFi are detailed in Table 1.
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The four selected inland community fisheries are: Koh Keo CFi, located in Kampong Chhnang 
Province, consisting of 113 members and covering 1,206 ha, with 1 ha of conservation 
area; Anlung Raing CFi, a floating community in Pursat Province of 178 members, covering 
1,341 ha; in Battambang Province, Bak Orm Reak Doun Ent CFi, with 1,466 members but a 
relatively small total area of 1,075 ha, and Sdey Krom Rohal Shoung CFi, consisting of only 
370 members but with a total area of 1,390 ha with 9.6 ha of conservation area – the largest 
of the CFis included in this study.
The five coastal province CFis are: Tumnob Rolork and Champu Khmao CFi in Preah 
Sihanouk Province, covering areas of 1,189 ha and 1,522 ha respectively. While 
comparable in both overall and conservation zone size, membership levels differ markedly, 
with Tumnob Rolork CFi at 1,369, and only 285 at Champu Khmao CFi. Kampong Samaki 
CFi in Kampot Province covers 578 ha, in the form of 528 ha of fishing area and 50 ha of 
conservation area; Phum Thmey CFi is in Kep Province, accounting for only 224 ha area – 
the smallest of the 9 CFi, yet with disproportionately high membership at 110. In Koh Kong 
Province, Thmor Sor CFi represents the largest of the coastal CFis in terms of size (11,220 





















Koh Keo village, Svay 
Chrum, Rolea B’ier 
district, Kampong 
Chhnang province
113 1,206 1,205 1
Anlung Raing
Kampong Lor village, 
Kampong Por  
commune, Krakor  
district, Pursat province
178 1,341 1,338.5 2.5
Bak Orm 
Reak- Doun Ent
Bak Orm Reak village, 
Prek Luong commune, 
Aek Phnom district, 
Battambang province
1,466 1,075 1,073.04 1.96
Sdey Krom-  
Rohal Shoung
Sdey krom village, Prek 
Luong commune, Aek 
Phnom district,  
Battambang province





Phumi Mouy village, 
Tomnob Rolork  
commune, Steung Hav 
district, Sihanoukville 
province
1,369 1,189 1,133 56
Champu 
Khmoa
Champu Khmoa village, 
Toul Toteung commune, 
Prey Nob district,  
Sihanoukville province
285 1,522 1,472 50
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Kompong Thnaut, Kon 
Sat, Teouk Chhou  
district, Kampot  
province
396 578 528 50
Phum Thmey
Thmey village, Sangkat 
Prey Thom, Kep town, 
Kep province
110 224 214 10
Thmor Sor
Srae Thmei village, 
Thmor Sor commune, 
Botum Sakor district, 
Koh Kong province
540 11,220 10,820 400
Focus group discussion on fishery right with Bak Orm Reak Doun Ent CFi, Battambang Province
Data and data collection methods
The research collected primary data using focus group discussions (FGD), key informant 
interview (KIIs) and case study interviews:
• The characterization of the CFis is based on primary quantitative data. In certain 
cases, the information collected was highly qualitative, and was quantified using 
a scoring system (from 1 to 5, weakest to strongest) based on specific criteria 
determined among the researchers and detailed in Annex 1.
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Community Fisheries typology
To make sense of the diversity and heterogeneity of the CFis, we characterized each with 
indicators that describe, along five broad topics, the context in which it has evolved:
• The participatory Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were conducted with CFi 
members – including men, women, and youth (under 18 years of age) – to 
assess the situation and challenges of CFi management; how CFi members come to 
understand their rights and responsibilities, and any gaps in capacity with respect 
to the exercise of these rights and fulfilment of their responsibilities. In total, 
nine FGDs were conducted across the nine CFis, with a total of 120 participants 
(55 female).
• Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were conducted with relevant stakeholders, 
including Provincial FiA; local NGOs; commune authorities; the Fisheries Coalition, 
and the heads of the CFis in which the FGD were conducted. These KIIs aimed to 
gather informant perspectives on the situation and challenges of fishermen in 
exercising their rights and responsibilities, and their support and suggestions for 
improving sustainable fishery resources management. In total, we interviewed 
37 participants (6 female).
• In each CFi, we randomly interviewed 4 non-CFi members, for a total of 32 CFi 
households, 8 of which were female-headed. These interviews were conducted 
in order to assess how non-members come to understand their rights related to 
fishing activities, and how they perceive the management and implementation 
of CFi within their area. The interviews also aimed to determine whether non- 
members know of and join CFi activities.
• The size and structure of the CFis: number of members; total CFi area; size 
of open space fishing area; size of mangrove/flooded forest/ conservation 
area, and size of areas where fishing is prohibited.
• The fishing efforts: fisth catch per capita (rainy and dry season).
• The assets of the community: batteries/flashlights; patrolling station; 
cement boundary markers; banners; a CFi hall, etc.
• The social capital resulting from interactions between co-management 
actors: scoring the collaboration with (i) local authorities; (ii) fisheries 
administration/Cantonment, and (iii) NGOs.






• The size and structure of the CFi
• The fishing efforts
• The assets of the community
• The social capital resulting from the interaction between co-management actors
• The commercial orientation of the CFi
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1. Smaller and institutionally less dynamic: 2 community fisheries, including Koh Keo 
CFi and Tumnob Rolork CFi, fall into the same typology – relatively small, poor, 
and less dynamic. This status is correlated to lesser levels of communication with 
and support from NGOs. Although Koh Keo CFi has fairly good communication 
with FiA Cantonment and local authorities, in contrast to Tumnob Rolork it has no 
commercial based-oriented activities, such as fish processing. Neither community 
has adequate physical assets.
2. Smaller and institutionally more dynamic: Bak Orm Reak Doun Ent CFi, 
Kampong Samaki CFi, and Phum Thmey CFi are small, but institutionally dynamic. 
Bak Orm Reak Doun Ent CFi is strong in terms of its relationship with relevant 
stakeholders, whereas the other two CFis are solid in terms of community 
physical assets and sub-group activities regarding processing, a savings group, 
and crab bank. Therefore, they tend to be richer and more dynamic.
3. Larger and institutionally less dynamic: although they have relatively big 
fishing grounds, Anlung Raing CFi, Champu Khmao CFi, and Thmor Sor CFi are 
poor and institutionally not very dynamic. This is attributed to two main factors, 
namely lower levels of community-based income earning activities and social capital, 
particularly with respect to relationships with local authorities and FiA 
Cantonment.
4. Larger and institutionally more dynamic: Sdey Krom Rohal Shoung CFi is the health-
iest and most dynamic CFi among the nine studied. This is a result of strength 
across vertical and horizontal connectivity; physical assets for community works, 
such as meetings and patrolling, and community-based commercial activities, 
with permits to sell fish in the conservation zone, and established savings groups.
We established a typology of CFis, with the aim of grouping community fisheries into 
relatively homogenous groups, i.e. based on similar characteristics (Table 2).
These indicators, of total CFi area size; total number of members; size of fishing area; 
size of conservation zone; CFi size per member; fishing zone area per member and 
conservation zone area per member, are well correlated. The study also found that the 
relationship between CFi and FiA Cantonment is well correlated with the relationship of 
CFi with local authorities; that is, a community characterized by better cooperation with 
the FiA Cantonment tends also to have better cooperation with local authorities such as 
commune councils, village chiefs, and the police. The indicators of physical assets – such 
as guard posts, cement poles, artificial fish breeding shelters, flashlights or a meeting hall 
– and the area of the community fishing grounds are also correlated; once there is a larger 
fishing zone, more physical assets are used for the community activities such as patrolling 
and holding meetings.
CFi exhibiting similar characteristics were categorized into four groups: (i) smaller and 
institutionally less dynamic, (ii) smaller and institutionally more dynamic, (iii) larger and 
institutionally less dynamic, and (iv) larger and institutionally more dynamic:
18
Table 2: Community Fisheries Typology
Type Name of CFis Zone Province
1.    Smaller and 
       institutionally 
       less dynamic
Koh Keo Cfi Inland Kampong Chhnang
Tomnob Rolork CFi Coastal Sihanoukville
2.    Smaller and 
       institutionally
       more dynamic
Bak Orm Reak- Doun Ent CFi Inland Battambang
Kampong Samaki Cfi Coastal Kampot
Phum Thmey CFi Coastal Kep
3.    Larger and  
       institutionally 
       less dynamic
Anlung Raing CFi Inland Pursat
Champu Khmao CFi Coastal Sihanoukville
Thmor Sor CFi Coastal Koh Kong
4.    Larger and 
       institutionally 
       more dynamic
Sdey Krom- Rohal Soung CFi Inland Battambang
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Research Findings
Review of the Cambodian legal framework on Community 
Fisheries and small-scale fishing rights
Cambodian small-scale fishing rights are written into the Royal Decree on the 
Establishment of Community Fisheries, the Law on Fisheries, Sub-Decree on Community Fishery 
Management, and Ministerial Proclamation on Community Fishery Guidelines, i.e., by-laws, 
internal rules, agreements and management plan (Kaing, 2013).
In addition to this legal framework for fisheries management, the RGC has generated 
fisheries management guidelines called the Cambodian Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries (CamCode), a national version of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing 
(CCRF). The Cambodian legal framework on CFi or small-scale fishing rights is reviewed as 
follows.
Annex 2 presents the different types of rights under the two broad categories: use and 
management. The following is a text that describes the main aspects of Annex 2.
Royal Decree on the Establishment of Community Fisheries (2005)
In Article 1, “all Cambodian people are given rights to voluntarily establish community 
fisheries in their own areas in order to strengthen their livings by using fisheries 
resources in a sustainable manner”; yet it goes on to state that the management of community 
fisheries is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 
Article 3 states that Community Fisheries whose fishing areas are adjacent are able to 
establish community fishery federations (RGC, 2005).
Law on Fisheries (2006)
Rights regarding the traditional use of fishery resources for local users are ensured 
under the Law on Fisheries and other related laws (Article 2). Subsistence fishing can be 
done at any time in the open access area, small-scale fishing areas, and marine fishery 
domains by using small-scale fishing gears (Article 31). The rights of Cambodian peoples, 
especially Community Fisheries are mainly stated in the Chapter 11 of the Law on Fisheries. For 
instance, Article 59 states that the Cambodian people have the right to create CFis in 
order to contribute to the sustainable management, conservation, development and use of 
fishery resources. CFis are authorized to manage their designated resources, based on 
submission of a community management plan and guidelines of the community fishery; 
however, they do not have the right to sell, exchange, hire, donate or divide the CFi 
area (Article 62).
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Fisheries management in Cambodia is under the jurisdiction of MAFF (Article 3), while 
the Fisheries Administration (FiA) is entitled to responsibility for fishery resources 
management (Article 6). This government body plays a dominant role in CFi 
development and law enforcement in terms of inspection, monitoring, surveillance, control of all 
fishery activities (Article 7) and fisheries offences (Article 72). Article 72 further indicates 
the jurisdictional responsibility of FiA Officers in legal procedures, including investigating 
offences and filing complaints. Article 74 concerns the obligations and responsibilities of 
local authorities and actors who have the duty to investigate, prevent, report, and to stop 
illegal fishing activities or temporarily detain offenders and evidence (RGC, 2006).
Sub-decree on Community Fisheries Management (2007)
The Sub-decree on Community Fisheries Management further details rights, roles, 
and responsibilities of CFis in fishery management. CFis have a role to play in 
managing and conserving fishery resources in line with CFi by-laws; in CFi area 
management, and in ensuring all community fishery members have equal rights in the 
sustainable use of fishery resources. CFis have the responsibility to immediately report any 
fisheries violations in the CFi area to the nearest FiA. They also have the right to work 
directly with the FiA to stop all fishery violations, by submitting requests to authorities 
for intervention, seizure of evidence of fisheries violations, and prosecution of offenders. 
Community members have the right to fish at family-scale, in accordance with the law and 
other regulations related to fisheries and the by-laws specific to Community Fisheries.
CFi can access, use and manage all fisheries resources in accordance with the 
community fishing area, and also engage in aquaculture, harvest, sell as individual members, in 
accordance with the community fishing area agreement and management plan (Article 11). 
However, they do not have the right to sell, exchange, rent, donate, share,  divide, borrow, 
or  transfer  the  community fishing area in any form (Article 13). 
Fisheries resource users who are non-members of the CFi group have the right to enter, 
leave, and use fisheries resources in the CFi area, but must comply with the by-laws and 
internal regulations of the community fisheries, community fisheries management plan, and 
all other legal instruments that relate to fisheries. Moreover, CFis have rights with respect 
to participation in all community activities and in decision-making (Annex 2; RGC, 2007).
Prakas on Guidelines for Community Fisheries (2007)
The prakas defines the guidelines for implementing CFis. It outlines the basic rules 
and procedures for the establishment, organization, and functioning of CFis in 
Cambodia. It is (should be) aligned with Cambodian fisheries policy, ongoing reforms and all 
subsequent laws and other legislation relevant to the management of 
fisheries. There are four types, including community fisheries by-laws, internal rules, 
agreement, and community fishery area agreement. These are mandatory for all 
community fisheries. Rights, roles, and responsibilities are mainly detailed in CFi by-laws
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and internal rules. The FiA participates in follow-up, monitoring, and enforcing 
implementation of the CFi area agreement and management plan, and making 
annual evaluations with participation from the commune council, CFi committee, and local 
people (MAFF, 2007).
The development of CFi in Cambodia has been mainstreamed by a number of 
donor-driven initiatives. There is actually very little variation in the CFi by-laws and 
regulations across the country.
CamCode: Cambodian Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
The Cambodian Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries is not a law but is included as 
a component (Vol. 3) of the Strategic Planning Framework for FiA (Fisheries 
Administration, 2011a), which provides guidelines and best practice principles, 
in line with relevant Cambodian and international laws, to all stakeholders in the 
fisheries sector in Cambodia on how to best comply with Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (UN FAOs) Code of Conduct of Responsible 
Fisheries (CCRF). There is no legal requirement to follow it, nor legal penalties for not 
doing so. There are fifteen general principles. One of them concerns recognizing and 
upholding the clear separation of roles and responsibilities of stakeholders involved in 
the management, development, use and conservation of fisheries and aquatic resources. 
Another principle is that the importance of fisheries to vulnerable groups, particularly 
women and marginalized groups, should be fully recognized. This principle is connected 
to the recognition of the key role of women in harvesting, aquaculture, processing, trade, 
purchasing, preparation and provision of fish for household consumption, and 
mainstreaming gender in all aspects of fisheries management, development, conservation, 
and use. The principle also emphasizes the provision of appropriate alternative livelihoods 
for vulnerable groups and small-scale fishers whose access is affected by changes in laws 
or policies. 
More importantly, rights regarding the use of living and non-living aquatic resources 
carry the obligation ensure the effective conservation and management of those 
resources. All participants in the Fisheries sector of Cambodia should, to the extent per 
mitted by national laws and regulations, ensure that decision-making processes are 
transparent and achieve timely solutions to urgent matters. Partners should understand 
the traditional rights of small-scale users of aquatic habitats and, where possible and in 
line with current policy, preferential access to those habitats should be provided to 
small-scale users, consistent with the sustainable use of those resources (Fisheries 
Administration, 2011a).
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Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale 
Fisheries (2015)
The Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries (SSF) 
(http://www.fao.org/fishery/ssf/guidelines/en) address sustainable small-scale fisheries 
in the context of food security and poverty alleviation. The SSF Guidelines place a high 
priority on the realization of human rights, for both men and women, and on the needs 
of vulnerable and marginalized groups in developing countries. Small-scale and artisanal 
fisheries cover all activities along the value chain, including pre-harvest, harvest and 
post- harvest activities undertaken by both men and women, playing an important 
role in food security and nutrition, poverty eradication, equitable development and 
sustainable resource utilization. There are thirteen guiding principles for small-scale fisheries, 
concerning human rights; culture; discrimination; gender; equity and equality; 
consultation and participation; rule of law; transparency; accountability; economic, social and 
environmental sustainability; holistic and integrated approaches; social responsibility, and 
feasibility and social and economic viability (FAO, 2015).
Right-based fisheries in context
The findings are presented by theme (Figure 4) to reflect the diversity of issues and 
challenges encountered in both the design and implementation of right-based fisheries, 
by CFi groups and other co-management actors, such as Fisheries Cantonment and local 
authorities. For each theme, a comparison is made between rights-based fisheries in 
context, and rights as defined by formal law or ‘by the book’.
Our study suggests that the rights-based regulations and incentive structures that are 
in place for community fisheries are inadequate to improve the management of either 
coastal or inland fisheries in all dimensions (productivity, control of illegal activities, benefit 
sharing, etc.). However, we highlight how local informal arrangements, made at the margin 
of a rights-based legal framework, can help to improve CFi management. These examples 
serve to formulate a wider, more inclusive fisheries policy.
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Rights and community fisheries access boundaries(6)
The CFi Sub-decree and all CFi regulations suggest that access to a CFi is not exclusively 
reserved for CFi members. Assuming they are aware of their rights, non-CFi members are 
also entitled to access, provided they respect the prevailing rules of the CFi. This situation 
was observed in all nine CFis we investigated. On the other hand, the delineation of CFi 
geographic boundaries generally includes a fishing area smaller than the area where 
fisherfolk actually fish. All fishermen continue to fish in areas outside CFi area, based 
on their labour capacity. Another aspect of the CFi ‘boundary problem’ is that the CFi 
covers an indistinct area that consists of seasonal refuges, and does not represent a distinct 
fisheries-relevant ecosystem. Although fishing effort may be controlled and specific areas 
reserved, fish are mobile. In the end, only capture determines benefits. The mobility of 
the resource stock casts doubt on the feasibility of artificially differentiating community 
fisheries from open access areas within a single integrated water system. As Van Acker 
(2005) states, the dynamics point to a continually rising discount factor, where all users 
will manage the fishery as if it was open-access, and the consequent collapse of the 
legal setup.
1. Access boundary here refers to the physical boundary of the CFi. The demographic boundary distinguishes members from 
non-members of the CFi.
(6)
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The combined effect of these factors creates two central problems in each CFi investigated: 
i) fishing grounds belonging to one CFi are used by both members and non-members of that 
particular CFi and ii) many fishermen are, at the same time, insiders in their own CFi and 
outsiders in others.
This situation results in fishermen adopting different logic and attitudes towards complying 
with the rules established by CFi. Members of a CFi are likely to be more aware of rules and 
regulations in their own CFi, and are socially more accountable to the other members and 
to the management committee of their particular CFi. Consequently, they are more inclined 
to comply with the rules. Non-members are not necessarily aware of the rules of the CFi 
because they have not participated in their design processes; they are less accountable to 
the members of the CFi and management committee of the CFi they are fishing in, and so 
are less likely to comply with their rules (or limit fishing efforts to protect future stock). We 
suggest that this is one of many reasons why illegal fishing has remained a central problem, 
despite the widespread establishment of CFi management committees.
This contradiction was observed in every CFi we visited, but was most apparent in the 
coastal area CFis. The intertidal area where the CFi regulations are actually applied is 
rather small in comparison with the total intertidal area used by fisherfolk. The restrictions 
are thus easily circumvented by local fishers, who simply operate in areas outside of that 
designated as a CFi, where a more business-as-usual attitude prevails.
Fishing vessels on their way out on Kampot River
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This situation results in fishermen adopting different logic and attitudes towards complying 
with the rules established by CFi. Members of a CFi are likely to be more aware of rules and 
regulations in their own CFi, and are socially more accountable to the other members and 
to the management committee of their particular CFi. Consequently, they are more inclined 
to comply with the rules. Non-members are not necessarily aware of the rules of the CFi 
because they have not participated in their design processes; they are less accountable to 
the members of the CFi and management committee of the CFi they are fishing in, and so 
are less likely to comply with their rules (or limit fishing efforts to protect future stock). We 
suggest that this is one of many reasons why illegal fishing has remained a central problem, 
despite the widespread establishment of CFi management committees.
This contradiction was observed in every CFi we visited, but was most apparent in the 
coastal area CFis. The intertidal area where the CFi regulations are actually applied is 
rather small in comparison with the total intertidal area used by fisherfolk. The restrictions 
are thus easily circumvented by local fishers, who simply operate in areas outside of that 
designated as a CFi, where a more business-as-usual attitude prevails.
In inland fisheries, the cancellation of the fishing lots is perceived positively by the 
fishermen because it is has resulted in an expansion of the community fisheries area. 
However, our respondents have also indicated that the opening of the fishing frontier has 
also opportunistically attracted new people into fishing (including commercial middle-scale 
fishers), and this increase has added to management uncertainty and a corresponding 
increase of illegal fishing.
Rights to community-based commercial fisheries operations
In order to support livelihoods, the CFis have been supported by FiA Canton-
ments of the National FiA and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), through 
the development of groups such as savings groups, fish processing groups, shrimp 
processing groups, and crab banks, and provision of trainings in the raising of livestock 
and production of souvenirs. These activities are carried out by members of the CFi, but 
the benefits generated are then distributed to individual members, and rarely to the 
community as a whole.
In fact, according to the Sub-decree on Community Fisheries management, a CFi has 
the right to fish, engage in aquaculture, harvest, sell, and use all fisheries resources in 
accordance with the community fishing area agreement and management plan (Article 
11). However, the sale of fish is possible only by individual fishers and their households; 
CFi-centred commercial fisheries cannot be undertaken on behalf of the wider community 
or CFi members.
Despite support from the NGO sector, any CFi scheme has a very limited capacity to 
generate revenue to help finance its regular activities, such as patrolling, organizing, 
congress and consultations. Collection of a membership fee is foreseen, but the 
principle does not seem very popular amongst local communities. In any case, this would
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not procure a significant budget for the daily activities of the community, and in this 
respect, co-management arrangements are highly dependent upon either external support 
or the FiA. This absence of a collective commercial right to sell is a key bottleneck of the 
system. The CFi system cannot be sustained in the long term without adequate funding, 
which the FiA does not have or is unwilling to invest in actual devolution of management 
decision-making. A weak financial state therefore limits the negotiation power of the CFi in 
subsequent co-management deliberations.
One notable exception is the community-based commercial fishing activity in Sdey Krom 
Rohal Shoung, classified in the typology as a larger and wealthier (group 4). In this area, 
a specific agreement with local FiA has allowed the community to sell fish from the 
conservation pond once a year in the dry season, to avoid the loss of the fish as the pond 
is too shallow their survival, and to use a portion of the income generated to finance CFi 
operations. From a strict legal perspective, these arrangements do not comply with the 
formal law. However, they are viewed by the local communities as effective activities in 
fisheries management.
Rights on Fish Catch and Fishing Gears
The Sub-decree on Community Fisheries Management explicitly states that CFis have rights 
to fish at family-scale fishing area (Article 3), defined by the Law on fisheries as an area 
reserved for individual or traditional community fishing, generally not for commercial 
purposes (Article 10), and where only family-scale gears as defined by MAFF can be used 
(Royal Government of Cambodia, 2006). Despite these restrictions, the sub-decree leaves it 
up to each individual CFi scheme to place limits on fishing gear numbers, size, and length, 
and/or individual catch, yet those must comply with fisheries law and the other related 
legislation.
At the CFi-level, there is a widespread perception among fishermen that individual fish 
catch is declining (observed in all CFi we visited), and a clear understanding that fishery 
stocks need to recover. All those interviewed reported a decrease in individual fish catch 
over the last five years and an increase in the number of fishers, particularly outsiders, 
using the fishery. This decline in individual fish catch is an issue that CFi management does 
not seem to be able to address, and one which decreases the sense of ownership with 
respect to community fisheries management.
However, none of the CFi regulations we have encountered include management provisions 
that actually try to limit the fish catch. Basically, fishermen have right to fish as much as 
they can, according to the availability of labour and decision-making rules at the household 
level.
Based on our field observations, the CFi is not the appropriate agency to control this. 
But the conservation of spawning and juvenile rearing grounds is very important for 
maintaining fish production. In all CFis assessed, a conservation area has been assigned to 
help secure fish production. These are the only protective measures undertaken by CFis to
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help maintain fisheries. These conservation areas are the most valuable areas of the 
CFi, and are under surveillance and monitoring by members. However, given that these 
conservation areas are usually refuge zones for migratory fishes (in both inland and coastal 
areas), attempts to conserve the fishery are not necessarily benefitting the people involved 
in the conservation efforts in that particular area.
As for fishing gear, there is a clear sense among CFi representatives of which gears are legal 
or not. The general perception is that the use of illegal fishing gears is in decline, but at 
the same time, all our respondents consider that illegal fishing remains a key problem in 
CFi management. One reason why individuals are not complying with the rules prohibiting 
the use of illegal fishing gears and fishing in protected areas is that the immediate benefits 
of higher catch outweigh the costs of being caught and the decline in future stocks (Viner, 
et al., 2006). CFi representatives consider they have very limited leverage to address this 
problem, due to limited resources to finance, monitoring and regulation enforcement. From 
a broader perspective, we observe that the rights-based incentive structure to deter illegal 
fishing is actually very weak.
Small scale fishers checking fishing gear before fishing in Thmor Sor CFi, Koh Kong province
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Rights to participate in decision-making processes
Co-management is the tool used to manage fishery resources in Cambodia. As set out 
in legal documents, the rights and responsibilities of management have been shared 
among responsible government institutions at national and sub-national levels and CFis. 
According to Chapter 11 of the Law on Fisheries, the FiA and local authorities play 
crucial roles in establishing a CFi, approving a community’s management plan, monitoring of 
implementation, and ensuring enforcement of related laws. They even have the discretion 
to cancel the CFi area agreement, if they think the CFi is not acting or performing well. 
In turn, communities have the right to manage their fishery resources with regard to of 
CFi management plans, procedures, and guidelines. The rights of the communities are 
specifically to enforce and comply with rules dictated by the FiA. Article 11 of the 
Sub-decree illustrates this: “community fisheries have the right to cooperate with the 
fishery competence to suppress all fisheries violations in the community 
fishing area. In cases of urgency and need, the CFi can request intervention by local 
authorities to seize evidence of fisheries violations, detain the offender then send him or her 
immediately to a competent Fisheries officer to deal with the offense in accordance with the 
law”. With the exception of two CFis (Kep and Kampot), in all CFis we assessed the arrest and 
sanctioning of offenders is under the control of the FiA. The CFis have the right to 
arrest and detain those caught for violations of the fishery law and must turn them over 
to FiA authorities. In a broader perspective any conflict resolution involving breach of CFi 
agreement and regulations must go through the FiA. Although the responsibility held by 
CFi in terms of monitoring and patrolling is significant, there is no formal role given to 
community-based management for conflict resolution within the fishery, despite the 
existence of conflict management mechanisms at the community-level. 
The Sub-decree on Community Fisheries envisions co-management in ways that are best 
described as community-based consultation and monitoring for fisheries management. 
Indeed, the role and power of the FiA in co-management is dominant; the community does 
not have any power to directly enforce CFi rules. This contradiction has much to do with 
each party’s perception of the key objectives of CFis: for the FiA, CFis are best considered 
as an arm of the state to improve fisheries management; whereas, for community users, 
the CFi is seen as an institutional arrangement to improve fish catch, livelihoods and food 
security.
This definition of rights and responsibilities has two major consequences: a) fishermen 
usually have a weak sense of ownership towards community fisheries institutions and, 
given the strong control of FiA over the whole CFi process, b) activities are sometimes 
undertaken exclusively by the CFi committee, creating an important gap between CFi 
members and committee members. This was prevalent in the Type 1 and 3 CFis, i.e., 
those characterized as less institutionally dynamic (irrespective of size). Based on our field 
observations, when an NGO is committed to support a CFi, the concerns and aspirations of 
regular fishers are better taken into account and, in certain cases, the NGO helps strengthen 
linkages between the CFi and the FiA in the management process.
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Notable exceptions to this scenario were observed in the cases of the CFis in Kampot and 
Kep Provinces, where an unofficial agreement exists between the FiA and CFi, allowing the 
communities to temporarily arrest offenders before the arrival of the FiA officers if they are 
capable of doing so. This arrangement is not in compliance with legally defined rights and 
responsibilities, yet it does enable more effective fishery resources management.
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Recommendations
• Rights for the community f isheries to conduct community-based 
commercial activities should be integrated into revisions of the sub-decree on 
community fisheries. Scale, potential resources, and location need to be very 
carefully considered while benefits sharing and use also need to be precisely stated. 
• FiA with relevant partners should introduce and pilot community-based 
fishing/aquaculture and post harvesting commercial activities in conjunction with the 
selected community fisheries. 
• Livelihood improvement and fisheries resource conservation through the 
establishment of sub-group activities, such as fishing processing groups, 
crab banks, multi-agriculture, youth groups, and community based 
patrols. The Community Fisheries need to be effectively financially and technically 
supported, expanded, and monitored.
• Implement community fishery-based policing through establishing 
effective local participatory monitoring to support the right of CFis to 
temporarily stop actual illegal fishing activities and detain offenders and provide 
evidence without a priori involvement of a Fishery Administration Officer.  
• The rights of non-community fishery members to access and fish in the 
community fishing area should be restricted under some conditions such as 
levying a fishing fee to the community, respecting community regulations 
and other related legal documents, participating in community activities, for 
instance, planting and reporting fisheries offence to the competent authorities.
• Allocate fisheries benefits to individual members from the community based 
on the productivity of individual fisheries ecosystem rather than collective CFi 
capacity through the application of ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) 
and review the current community fishing governance structure for any reforms to 
individual CFi by-laws.
• The enable wider participation of  all related stakeholders into the Technical Working 
Group on Fisheries in order to support the timely, just and effective implementation of 
SSF Voluntary Guidelines.
• Create a transparent and accountable assessment mechanism for 
reviewing the effectiveness of any and all management activities carried out by all Royal 
Government of Cambodia (RGC) Ministries and line agencies involved in the 
implementation and administration of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) Sustainable Small-scale Fisheries (SSF) Voluntary Guidelines.
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• Create a transparent and accountable reporting mechanism by which the results of 
any and all SSF Voluntary Guideline implementation assessments will be reported 
in a timely fashion to the FAO and all relevant Cambodian state, civil and non-state 
actors involed in the monitoring and evaluation of the Voluntary Guidelines for SSF 
implementation activities.
• Create a transparent and accountable review mechanism to make recommendations 
for future legal reforms in order to better harmonize real fishing practice in both 
marine and freshwaters with the SSF Voluntary Guidelines and Cambodian fishing laws, 
sub-decrees and proclamation processes.
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Annex 1. Explanation on weighting criteria for CFi typology
Weight of collaboration 
with local authorities
This is based on interviews with commune 
councillors (CC) and CFi members. For instance, 
when the team interviewed CC in Thmor Sor CFi, 
he said that there is no collaboration with CFi 
because CFi has never sent report to CC or 
informing about any activities of CFi. That is 
why we decided to rank 1 for Thmor Sor CFi. 
Another example, for Sdey Krom-Rohal Soung CFi 
it is found that CFi and CC has strong collaboration. 
Because CFi always work closely with CC, report 
about activities; invite CC to join CFi meeting and 
field work. We obtained this information from CFi 
leader and CC during field testing and actual field 
data collection. In addition, for Koh Keo CFi, during 
scoping visit and field data collection, participants 
reported about the case of illegal fishing activities 
combating, which received support from CC. For 
ranking number 2 is for CFi that has occasionally 
collaborative with CC. CC rarely be invited by CFi 
to join any meeting. 5 means there is very good 
collaboration compare to other CFis and 1 means 
there is no collaboration at all. The comparison is 
made only among these 9 CFis.
Weight of collaboration 
with Fisheries 
 Administration  
Cantonment
The way to weight this point is not much different 
from how collaboration with local authorities was 
ranked. We discussed how often each CFi work 
with FiA; what kind of support has FiA provided; 
what kind of intervention when CFi reported about 
illegal fishing activities. For example Sdey Krom 
Rohal Soung, have received lot of trainings from 
FiA, moreover, this CFi have strong support in case 
of emergency needed (when the fish were dead, 
FiA were quickly respond to check). Anlung Raing 
Rang rate only 1 because of the collaboration with 
FiA is too low and this CFi is too far to reach.
Annexes
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Weight of collaboration 
with NGOs
We investigated about which and how many NGO 
are working with CFi; what kind of support has CFi 
received from those NGOs, how often NGO come 
to CFi, 
Weight of community 
based-commercial 
orientation
We looked at what kind of livelihood interven-
tion means in each CFi. For instance, in Phum 
Thmey CFi, many livelihood based projects were 
reported including souvenir producing, crab bank, 
saving group, and livestock, which part of benefit 
was shared to CFi and its members. Another case, 
in Koh Keo CFi there was no community commer-
cial at all. 
Annex 2. Review of rights-based fisheries rules by individual 
legal type
User Rights Legal Framework 





Law on Fisheries 
• Subsistence fishing can be operated at any time in the 
open access area and in the family-scale fishing areas, 
in freshwater fishing lots during the closed season or in 
marine fishery domains by using small-scale fishing gears 
(Article 31).
Sub-decree on CFis Management
• CFi has rights to fish, do aquaculture, harvest, sell, 
and use all fisheries resources in accordance with the 
community fishing area agreement and management 
plan (Article 11).
• CFi members have right to fish at family-scale in 
accordance with the law, other regulations related to 
fisheries, and the by-laws of the CFis (Article 13).
CFi Internal Rules
• Fishing in CFi conservation area is not allowed. It 
must be interrupted and the offender must make a 
promise to stop fishing, and the case must be reported 
immediately to local authorities and FiA that has 
jurisdiction (Article7).
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Sub-decree on CFis Management
• CFi has rights to fish, do aquaculture, harvest, sell, 
and use all fisheries resources in accordance with the 
community fishing area agreement and management 
plan (Article 11).
• CFi members have right to fish at family-scale in 
accordance with the law, other regulations related to 
fisheries, and the by-laws of the CFis (Article 13).
CFi Internal Rules
• Non-members can enter and fish in the community 
fishing area, but must inform the CFi committee and 
obey the community fishing area agreement , by-laws, 








• Transporting, processing, buying, selling, and stocking 
endangered fishery resources are permitted under 
permission (Article 23). 
• Catching, selling, buying, stocking, and transporting 
fingerling or fish eggs and other aquatic animals’ offspring 
or eggs are permitted under permission (Article 23). 
• Buying or selling ornamental shells of rare species is 
permitted under permission (Article 23). 
• Expanding farm lands or salt field in the fishery domains 
is permitted under permission (Article 23).
• It is a prohibition of commercial collection, transpor-
tation, and stocking of woods, firewood or charcoals of 
inundated and mangrove forest species (Article 28).
• It is a prohibition of the construction of kilns, handicraft  
places, processing places and all type of plants using raw 





users can go 
(where)
Law on Fisheries
• Users can operate subsistence fishing at any time in the open 
access area and in the family-scale fishing areas, in freshwa-
ter fishing lots during the closed season or in marine fishery 
domains by using small-scale fishing gears (Article 31).
• In the Protected and Conservation Areas, any fishing 
activities are prohibited, except for special permission from 
MAFF to the FiA to conduct the fishery scientific, technical 
research and experiment (Article 19).
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• By pass navigations or any activities in the fisheries 
conservation areas are also banned, except competent 
officers in case of law enforcement (Article 19).
• Sub-decree on CFis Management
• CFi has rights to fish, do aquaculture, harvest, sell, 
and use all fisheries resources in accordance with the 
community fishing area agreement and management 
plan (Article 11).
• CFi members have right to fish at family-scale in 
accordance with the law, other regulations related to 
fisheries, and the by-laws of the CFis (Article 13).
CFi Internal Rules 
• Non-members can enter and fish in the community 
fishing area, but must inform the CFi committee and obey 
the community fishing area agreement, by-laws, internal 






• It is a prohibition of all kind of fishing activities in 
the fishery domain by using the prohibited fishing 
gears including inter alia electrocute fishing gears, 
poisonous chemicals, explosives, pumping dry gears, 
spear in combination with projected light, gillnet or seine 
net with mesh size smaller than 1.5 cm, mosquito net, 
pair trawling nets, encircling net with light etc. (Article 
20).
• Fishing by gears namely Manh, Chon, Neam, Mong 
Krolok, Mong Os, Chhneang Os Leas/Kchao in 
inland fisheries, and Chhneang Os Kreng Chheam in 
coastal fisheries, which are dragged or pushed by engine 
power are permitted under permission (Article 23).
CFi Internal rules
• CFi members use family-scale fishing gears during 
open fishing season as its length, size, and number are 
specified in the community fishery internal rules (Article 
6).
• CFi members are not allowed to use forbidden gears, 
fish illegally, or clear forest or mangrove forest, or 
destroy coral or sea grass. They will be must be punished 
according to the Fisheries Law (Article 7).
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• Non-members can enter and fish in the community 
fishing area, but must inform the CFi committee and 
obey the community fishing area agreement, by-laws, 







• The closed season for middle-scale fishing is from 01 June 
to 30 September for the inland fishery domains located 
north of Tonle Chaktomok parallel and from 01 July to 31 
October for the inland fishery domains located south of Tonle 
Chaktomok parallel (Article 16). 
• Subsistence fishing can be operated at any time in the 
open access area and in the family-scale fishing areas, 
in freshwater fishing lots during the closed season or in 






do and NOT 
allowed to do
Sub-decree on CFis Management
• CFi has rights to fish, do aquaculture, harvest, sell, 
and use all fisheries resources in accordance with the 
community fishing area agreement and management 
plan (Article 11).
• CFi has no rights to sell, exchange, rent, donate, share, 
transfer the community fishing area divide, borrow, pawn, 
or at all and in any form (Article 12).
• CFi has no rights to erect dams or carry out fishing that 
obstructs the passage of streams, creeks, canals or fish 
migrations. This can be done only with the approval of 
the MAFF on the request of the central level FA, following 
consultation with relevant institutions (Article 12).
• CFi has no rights to divide and privatize the inundated 
forest and mangrove forest areas, flooded areas within 
the community fishing area approve by the MAFF the CFis 
to manage (Article 12).
• CFi has no rights to enter into any relevant agreements in the 
community fishing area with any physical persons or legal 




• The CFi has no rights to sell, exchange, hire, donate or 
divide the community fishing area (Article 62).
Consultation Workshop on the Amendment of Sub-decree 
on CFis Management
• Clear new right of CFi to do fishing, do aquaculture, 
harvest, process, sell, use and manage all fisheries resources 
and to promote ecotourism and other potential business in 
accordance with the community fishing area agreement and 
management plan (Article 11).
• CFi committee to exploit commercial fishing at a part of their 
CFi boundary in order to get benefit for implementation CFi 
management. In this case, CFi committee can make their 
request through provincial FiA (cantonment level) and 
central FiA (National Level) for getting approval from 






Rights to use and manage fisheries resources are designed 
for users as well as managers and recognized in the Royal 
Decree on the Establishment of CFis, Sub-decree of 
Community Fisheries Management, Law on Fisheries, 
and annexes of the Prakas on the Community Fisheries 
Guidelines. Recognized rights to use are already mentioned 
above, but rights to manage fisheries are mentioned below:
Royal Decree on the Establishment of CFis
• The MAFF has general jurisdiction over management 
community fisheries (Article 1).
• Community fisheries shall have by-laws, internal 
regulations, management plans, maps of their 
community fishing areas and agreements recognized by the 
competent authorities (Article 2).
Law on Fisheries
• The fishery management is under the jurisdiction of 
MAFF (Article 3).
• The FiA under the MAFF is a responsible for the 
management of fisheries and fishery resources based on 
the National Fishery Policies and this law (Article 6).
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 • FiA plays role in law enforcement such as inspection, 
monitoring, surveillance and controlling of all fishery 
activities as being a judiciary police (Article 7).
• CFi is responsible to manage the community fishing 
areas in accordance with their community fishery 
management plan, procedure and guideline of 
community fishery (Article 62). 
• The officers of the Fisheries Administration have the 
competence as a judiciary police officer in investigating 
the fishery offence and file a complaint to the competent 
tribunal. Investigating, controlling, preventing and 
protecting against fishery offence are the competence of 
the Fisheries Administration (Article 72).
• Local authorities, armed forces, custom, airport, port au-
thorities, and other concerned authorities facilitate and 
provide forces to investigate, prevent and crack down on 
fisheries offences or temporarily keep all evidences of 
offence in case there is a proposition from the Fisheries 
Administration officer (Article 74).
• In case of the competent authorities mentioned in the 
above paragraph have found the actual fishery offences 
as below, the authorities: 
• 1. Immediately report to the nearest competent Fisheries 
       Administration officer. 
• 2. Temporarily detain the suspect and evidences then send 
       immediately to FiA who is habilitated as judiciary police 
        officers to execute the law.
• 3.  Could neither directly fine nor seize evidence of the 
         fishery offences (Article 74).
Sub-decree on CFi Management
• CFi has right to cooperate with the Fisheries Administra-
tion to suppress all fisheries violations in the community 
fishing area. In cases of urgency and need, the community 
fisheries can request intervention by nearby competent 
authorities to seize evidence of the fisheries violation and 
detain the offender then send him or her immediately to 
a Fisheries Administration competence to deal with the 
offense in accordance with the law;
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• CFi has rights to communicate with any other 
community fisheries, physical persons or legal entities for 
benefit of the community fisheries in accordance with all 
legal instruments that are in force;
• CFi has rights to manage all fisheries resources in line with 
the community fishing area agreement and management 
plan (Article 11).
• CFi has right to make a complaint or provide 
information on any problems which affect the interests of the 
community fisheries to the FiA, Commune/ Sangkat 
Council, and relevant agencies (Article 13).
• Only the community fisheries committee has the right 
to apply to the FiA cantonment to request approval for a 
community fishing area agreement. They may 
request technical assistance from the FiA or an individ-
ual with skills in community fisheries management to 
formulate a draft of the community fishing area 
agreement (Article 21).
Community Fishery By-laws (Article 4)
       CFi members have rights to:
• Participate in the congress and vote equally;
• Vote and stand as a candidate for election to the 
community fisheries committee in accordance with these 
by-laws and internal rules of the community fisheries
• Receive information on the socio-economic status of 
the community fisheries from the community fisheries 
committee;
• Request that an extraordinary congress be called in order 
to discuss and decide on any issue, if there is a request from 
at least one third of all the members of the community 
fisheries;
• Participate in all activities of the community fisheries;
• File complaints or provide information on any problems 
that impact on the interests of the community to Fisheries 
Administration officials, commune/sangkat councils, local 
authorities, and relevant officials;
• Receive support from any sources for the benefit of the 
community.
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Community Fishery Internal rules (Article 4)
• CFi committee have rights to punish CFi members 
(education, warning, suspend membership), 
bring conflicts to the congress to make decision, 
suspend fishing activities, make agreements with 
offenders that will stop their fishing activities, and 
report immediately to FiA in the case of fishing 
activities exceeding the size and number, or not of the 
type, time, or location, specified in the community fishing 
area management plan and agreement.
• Congress has rights to decide on dismissal of member-
ship, compensation for damage to the prosperity of the 
community fisheries; decide on punishment of the 
committee, punish members or other individuals when 
the committee is unable to resolve the case.
Consultation workshop on the amendment of sub-decree 
on CFis management. 
• New rights are being developed, for example the CFi has 
right to protect not only inside their CFi boundary, but 
also the adjacent area outside the boundary (Article 11 of 
the sub-decree. ), according to the consultation workshop 
on the amendment of sub-decree on CFis management.
Choice of the 
rights
Rights to fish folks are defined and mentioned above.
Allocation of 
the rights
Rights to use and manage fisheries are allocated to users, 
especially CFi members and non CFi members, and key 
managers, CFis and FiA based upon the above mentioned 
articles of relevant legal framework.  
Monitoring of 
rights
Asserting existing rights are monitored by the responsible 
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